Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Update March 28, 2010

Lindsey's email response to "Dwayne":

Dwayne, Lindsey Springer here. Maybe I can help you understand why the US Special Trial Attorney said what he said during one of my defenses (doc. 71, pg. 4). I took 11 depositions in March and April 2009, including the lady who signs notice of liens and release of liens named R.A. Mitchell. If you follow the Hughes decision at paragraph 23 and 75 (original report)(19 and 70 respectively in this link) you will understand how delegations of authority the last time any judicial officer addressed the subject was said to work.

Each of the employees I was allowed to depose, and that is all they are is employees of the United States, as they are not delegates under 26 U.S.C. section 7701(a)(11) or (12)(2009), nor are they delegates under 26 CFR 301.7701(9)(2009), testified that they nolonger work for a district director or under a district director structure because those positions were eliminated by the chief counsel in late 1999 until the beginning of 2000 (many were difficult to change all at one). Where things get confusing for the sound bite looker is how the elimination was conducted.

You can resolve any doubt by asking yourself what is the name of the current district director over the place I live?

Some have argued that the1998 overhaul ("overhaul" interesting word and did not mean haul away) directed the abolishing of internal revenue districts. That argument does not work on "intention" because in the 1998 act Congress specifically makes mention of district directors in amending a certain section of the tax code. Also, Section 7621 clearly and unmistakbly shows districts are needed to administer and enforce the tax code. Several regulations also maintain district directors and internal revenue districts are the only manner in which such enforcement and administration is to happen. I maintain there is a difference between voluntary compliance and "enforcement" which lacks any suggestion of voluntary about anything. My defense centers around the "enforcement" side and not the voluntary compliance side. See 26 CFR 601.107(2009) (crminal investigation division "mission" of district director for purpose to "encourage and achieve highest degree of voluntary compliace")

If you look at 26 CFR 601.101(2009) you will see the entire judicial theory of the IRS stems from this regulation. If you then see 26 CFR 301.7701-10(2009) you will see how that is supposed to flow.

"Plaintiff apparently believes that this conclusion is avoided by his assertion that the IRS is a "private corporation," and not a part of the United States. Plaintiff offers two arguments for this conclusion. The first is that the IRS was never created by "positive law" (i.e., a statute of Congress) but by fiat of the Secretary of the Treasury in 1952. It is clear, however, that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a statute of Congress, gave the Secretary of the Treasury full authority to administer and enforce the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7801, and the power to create an agency to administer and enforce the tax laws. See 26 U.S.C. § 7803(a). Pursuant to that legislative grant of authority, the Secretary created the IRS, 26 C.F.R. § 601.101, so that the IRS is an agency of the Department of the Treasury, created pursuant to Congressional statute. As such, the IRS is a creature of "positive law," and an agency of the federal government, not a private corporation." See Snyder v. CIR 596 F. Supp. 240, 247 (1984)(D.C. Indiana).

Now I know most say 1984 district court decision? Do not be fooled. In the most recent case citing to 601.101 where the DOJ sought the Court to determine the IRS was an "agency" (why would they need to do that?) under section 371, the district court wrote:

"Internal Revenue Code (IRC) 26 U.S.C. § 7801(a) provides the administration and enforcement of the IRC "shall be performed by or under the supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury." In addition, 26 U.S.C. § 7803(a) provides for the appointment of a
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the Department of the Treasury who "shall have such duties and powers as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury," including the power to "administer, manage, conduct, direct, and supervise the
execution and application of the internal revenue laws." Finally, Department of the Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. § 601.101(a)
provides in pertinent part:

The Internal Revenue Service is a bureau of the Department of the Treasury under the immediate
direction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Commissioner has general superintendence of the
assessment and collection of all taxes imposed by any law providing internal revenue. The Internal Revenue
Service is the agency by which these functions are performed.

[Page 3]

The Supreme Court has noted "the Internal Revenue Service is organized to carry out the broad responsibilities of the
Secretary of the Treasury under section 7801(a) of the [Internal Revenue] Code for the administrative and enforcement of the
internal revenue laws." Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 534 (1971). Moreover, the Tenth Circuit has held: "[T]he IRS is an agency of the United States government and, of course, a conspiracy to defraud that agency necessarily constitutes a
conspiracy to defraud the United States." United States v. Scott, 37 F.3d 1564, 1584 (10th Cir. 1994). See also McNeil v. United
States, 78 Fed. Cl. 211, 221 (2007) ("[T]he IRS is an agency of the United States government.").

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes the fact that the IRS is an agency of the United States government is both
"generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court" and "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned" including by reference to publicly available statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions. See Fed.R.Evid. 201(a).The Court, therefore, takes judicial notice of that fact."

U.S. v. DUTSON (Or.U.S.D.C.)(1-28-2010)(08-CR-206-BR)

Notice how much the District Court in Oregon left out of its quoting 601.101. Here is the actual words from the begining with highlighted words left out:

(a) General. The Internal Revenue Service is a bureau of the Department of the Treasury under the immediate direction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Commissioner has general superintendence of the assessment and collection of all taxes imposed by any law providing internal revenue. The Internal Revenue Service is the agency by which these functions are performed. Within an internal revenue district the internal revenue laws are administered by a district director of internal revenue.

So now the IRS is within a "territory" of the United States in Oregon! Oregon of course is Title 28, Section 117 and not the State of Oregon. Again do not get lost. The devil is in the details.

So to answer the question other than a U.S. Special Trial Lawyer agreement with me that districts were abolished where does the law abolish the IRS districts? It simply does not exist. Section 7621 remains the tax law. No law abolished or repealed section 7621. All you have to do is take a trip down regulation station and you will see all delegations remain flowing from Secretary to Commissioner to District Director to sub delegates of the District Director of each internal revenue district. Title 4, Section 72 prohibits any office of Government from being exercised outside D.C. unless expressly provided by Law.

Without regulations what enforcement could the Secrertary himself exercise outside D.C.? Take away 26 CFR 601.101(2009) and IRS is not an agency. Take away 26 CFR 301.7701-9, 7701-10 (2009), no district director or delegate of the Secretary would exist. Then there is the key ones. 26 U.S.C. section 6301 which clearly directs only the Secretary can collection taxes owed to the United States.

26 CFR 301.6301(2009) says all taxes imposed by the code are to be collected by "district directors" so sayeth the Secretary.

Since at least 2000, my defense is that there has been no authority of the Secretary authorized by law outside the District of Columbia to be exercised by the Secretary or anyone else. I live in the State of Oklahoma and the State of Oklahoma is not within the District of Columbia.

I do not know how the three questions I have asked the Supreme Court will ultimately be decided but when they first ordered me to serve each of the 6 federal judges all 6 remained silent with no response whatsoever. The Solicitor also waived. Whoever is arguing this issue must be better prepared than the Devil himself as details will otherwise surely prevent resolution of the main issue. What is the impact abolishing all internal revenue districts has upon enforcement and administration of the internal revenue laws outside the District of Columbia from 2000 to present?

Hope this helps in some way understand what I am saying in my defense. Lindsey Springer 3.28.2010

To all who oppose I simply begin with ok, then what is the name of your district director over the place you live and what law provides him with that cover?

Update March 15, 2010

Lindsey Springer here and hoping this update finds you both well and encouraged.

Little background. On March 18, 2009 Judge Payne recused himself in 09-cr-043 (criminal indictment brought against me). The rules of the Court were to have random reassignment. That did not happen. For 13 days the Clerk of Court was my "judge". On March 31, 2009, Chief Judge Eagan hand picked Judge Friot out of the Western Judicial District of Oklahoma.

I objected. Meanwhile, on June 28, 2009 U.S. Attorney resigned leaving no appointment or other person to "prosecute" me. Trial began on October 26, 2009. After 10 hours and some judicial intrusion of the Sixth Amendment a jury returned guilty verdict on the Court’s jury instructions.

On November 27, 2009, I petitioned the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals for a Writ of Mandamus dealing with the selection of Judge Friot, that judicial district and internal revenue districts do not coincide, and regarding the paperwork reduction act errors made by Judge Friot at trial.

On December 4, 2009, a three judge panel in 09-5165 issued an order concluding Judge Friot was "designated" but not "assigned" according to Title 28, Section 292(b) and the rest of my issues could wait for the appeal process. I disagreed. I have given the 10th Circuit four different times to rule on the merits of the PRA and the closest I got was on August 31, 2009 where they said I raise difficult issues and the Commissioner’s attorneys made frivolous arguments. That case currently is pending for conference in the Supreme Court on March 19, 2010 regarding whether a penalty is a penalty and what "notwithstanding any other provision of law" means.

On December 10, 2009, six days later, Chief Judge Henry from the 10th Circuit resigned as a Judge and Chief Judge.

Meanwhile, on January 13, 2010 I filed a Petition for Mandamus with the Supreme Court of the United States. 09-8701. This involved six judges. I was ordered on January 26, 2010 to serve process on each of the six federal judges involved. I did that and they were given until late February to file any opposition. They each remained silent as one would expect most Americans would do under the circumstances. I remain shocked at how Americans claim the Fifth Amendment of silence and they are indicted while Judges remain silent without any ramifications.

Anyway, the Supreme Court set conference for March 5, 2010 in 09-8701. On March 8, 2010, they sent me an order requesting I submit my Petition for Writ of Mandamus under a rule written by attorneys and for attorneys. There were many other cases that were dismissed or denied but I survived the conference.

In the Petition I have raised three issues. They are as follows:

I. Has Chief Circuit Judge in Misc. # 23 and the Panel in 09-5165, so far departed from Title 28, United States Code, Section 292(b), including the sanctioning of such departure by a lower district court, calling for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power pursuant to S.Ct. Rule 10(a) to render such exercise clear abuse of such limited power extended by Section 292(b)?

A. Does Title 28, United States Code, Section 292(b) authorize a Chief Judge of a circuit, to designate United States’ Judicial District Court Judges commissioned in one "Oklahoma" judicial district, to 1 year terms in the other two "Oklahoma" judicial districts on a renewable yearly basis for no reason?

B. What is the limitation on the meaning of the term "temporarily" and phrase "public interest" in Title 28, United States Code, Section 292(b)?

C. Does Misc. # 23 qualify as a lawful and legal Article III designation pursuant to Title 28, Section 292(b) of Stephen P. Friot to 09-cr-043?

D. Should all orders entered by Stephen P. Friot in 09-cr-043 outside Stephen P. Friot’s Western Judicial District Court commission be rendered coram non judice and invalid?

II. When the Secretary abolishes "internal revenue districts," by calender year 2000 encompassing the State of Oklahoma, what original, territorial, and subject matter jurisdiction does a District Court Judge have over alleged "internal revenue law" offenses pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3231?

III. Is a United States Judicial District under Title 28, United States Code, Section 116(a) a valid substitute for an "internal revenue district" required for administration and enforcement of the "internal revenue laws" pursuant to Title 26, United States Code, Section 7621 in the State of Oklahoma?

Those experienced have concluded once I comply with the Court’s most recent order derived from the conference of March 5, 2010, that they have taken the beginning steps of taking direct aim at the issues above. Obviously they should. Issue # 2 and # 3 are at the heart of why issue # 1 arose in the first place. I call this judge shopping by other judges (unauthorized shopping).

Anyway, I have filed a number of personal Mandamus Petitions and other writs and have never survived the original conference meeting. I cannot say that anymore. I have now survived that meeting.

I realize most do not understand what is going on and that the procedures are so difficult to understand it remains a blur. I however am watching every procedure like an eternal hawk. If you read the above orders list from the Supreme Court you will see the number of cases that were denied and dismissed. Again, I was not.

The Supreme Court addressing internal revenue district and district director or the difference between an internal revenue district and a judicial district are currently the object of my Petition’s affection and could go a long way to helping fix what is so wrong with one part of this Country.

I need your continued help. I realize most of you probably have lost hope but I have not. Please consider recommitting to help me submit the documents the Supreme Court has asked me to submit by March 29, 2010.

If you wish to send me by mail that address is 5147 S. Harvard, # 116, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74135. If you wish to send paypal you can use My other Petition regarding the "difficult issues between the tax code and the PRA" is up for conference this Friday.

Thank you for not ever giving up. Lindsey Springer. March 15, 2010